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Abstract  –  In  listed  companies,  the  Board  of  directors  is  the  ultimate  responsible  of 
information disclosure. The “conventional wisdom” considers independence of directors as 
the essential attribute to improve the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach 
subordinates expertise to independence. However, effective certification may require firm-
specific  expertise,  in  particular  for  intangible-intensive  business  models.  However,  this 
latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured 
and evaluated. We show that there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each 
company, related to the magnitude of intangible resources. 
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Over  the  last  decade,  the  multiplication  of  high  profile  corporate  scandals  and 
bankruptcies (Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers, AIG, etc.) has put the 
control  of  public  companies’  executive  management  at  the  forefront  of  the  agenda. 
From this point of view, information disclosure is (almost) universally regarded at the 
cornerstone of an effective institutional design, especially when (minority) shareholders 
are at ‘a distance’ of the company and its business model (Berle and Means, 1932). 
 
Yet,  as  regulators  and  academics  have  long  ago  recognized,  relevant  and  reliable 
information disclosure crucially depends on corporate governance (Brown, 2007): who 
is  accountable  for  the  production  and  certification  of  financial  and  non-financial 
reporting?  This  issue  necessarily  implies  to  penetrate  the  ‘black  box’  of  public 
companies, to investigate the set of relationships existing between the different firm’s 
constituencies  (Cohen,  Krishnamoorthy  and  Wright,  2004).  Invariably,  the  analysis 
points to the responsibility of the Board of directors, which acts as strategic counsellor, 
facilitator of network relations, and monitor of the business affairs (see e.g. Johnson, 
Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). This latter role notably includes hiring and firing the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and other executive managers, determining executive pay and 
supervising the processes of reporting and disclosure of the business firm. The Board 
achieves this latter objective by recommending the external auditor to shareholders, and 
by interfacing with the external auditors, the internal auditors, and the management. In 
addition, in almost all jurisdictions, the Board should certify financial statements and 
other  public  information
2.  In  this  way,  it  helps  alleviate  the  agency  problem  by 
facilitating the regular release of unbiased accounting information by managers to those 
who  hold  a  stake  in  the  business  firm  (including  shareholders),  thus  reducing  the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
 
The crucial question is then the following: what are the characteristics of the Board 
likely to improve the performance of this certification role? The “conventional wisdom” 
(Bhagat and Black, 1999), both among regulators and corporate governance scholars, 
                                                 
2 In the U.S. case, existing signature requirements for reports filed under the 1934 Exchange Act and the 
2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act demand at least a majority of directors to sign annual reports taking specific 
responsibility  on  them  even  beyond  formal  compliance  with  accounting  standards.  According  to  the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the “critical test” is “whether the financial statements as a whole fairly 
present the financial position” of the company (see U.S. v. Simon, 425 F. 2d 796, 805-6 (2nd Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970)). The importance of the Board in shaping the overall quality of public 
company reporting is regularly reaffirmed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Brown, 2007), 
whose primary function is to ensure adequate disclosure. A conspicuous example is provided for by the 
W. R. Grace Report (1997) – a section 21(a) Report – that notes: “the Commission considers it essential 
for  board  members  to  move  aggressively  to  fulfil  their  responsibilities  to  oversee  the  conduct  and 
performance  of  management  and  to  ensure  that  the  company’s  public  statements  are  candid  and 
complete”.  In  the  British  case,  the  Combined  Code  on  Corporate  Governance  (2003)  –  listing  rules 
required  public  company  to  report  on  how  it  applies  the  principles  in  this  Code  or  to  provide  an 
explanation – clearly states: “Non-executive directors should scrutinise the performance of management 
in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance. They should satisfy 
themselves  on  the  integrity  of  financial  information  and  that  financial  controls  and  systems  of  risk 
management are robust and defensible” (p.5). In the French case, legal duties for directors are stated in 
the  Code  de  commerce:  article  L.232  indicates  that  in  listed  companies,  the  Board  must  certify  the 
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points to ‘independence’ of directors as the essential attribute. As noted by Cunningham 
(2007), it is by now usual to answer to corporate crises by looking to transparency 
assured by independent directors, where independence is defined or proxied through a 
set of formal criteria (de jure or formal independence). The Sarbanes Oxley Act, passed 
in  2002,  is  no  exception,  requiring  that  audit  committees  be  comprised  solely  of 
independent members. The objective is clear: de jure independence should help to limit 
conflict of interests, thus increasing the performance of directors in their monitoring 
activity. In the case of certification, independence guarantees that the decision not to 
validate biased information is made without collusion or delay. 
 
Some  recent  evolutions  suggest  that  this  ‘conventional  wisdom’  is  progressively 
challenged,  with  expertise  being  increasingly  recognized  as  a  decisive  attribute, 
especially  for  the  audit  committee  (Cunningham,  2007).  In  particular,  the  Sarbanes 
Oxley Act introduced a path-breaking provision, by requiring that all audit committee 
members  have  financial  literacy  and  that  at  least  one  person  be  a  financial  expert 
(section  407)
3.  The  idea  is  intuitive:  generic  expertise  in  accounting  and  finance, 
acquired through education or professional activity, potentially increases the relevance 
and reliability of disclosure and improves the quality of financial and non-financial 
reporting that the Board must certify.  
 
Yet, especially for certain types of business models, effective, trustworthy certification 
requires  firm-specific,  in  complement  to  generic,  expertise.  It  will  be  the  case,  in 
particular, whenever intangible resources, related to innovation, knowledge and human 
resources, are significant drivers of the performance potential of the business firm. The 
main  reason  is  that  these  ‘intangible’  resources,  by  their  very  nature,  raise  serious 
problem  of  valuation  (recognition  and  measurement)  for  outsiders  and  often  lack 
efficient market pricing (Lev, 2001). From an accounting point of view, the dilemma is 
then  the  following:  either  deliberately  ignoring  those  resources  –  exacerbating 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders – or applying specific reporting 
rules – which require firm-specific expertise by directors to be efficiently implemented. 
 
The  critical  point  then  is  that  this  latter  form  of  expertise  trades-off  with  de  jure 
independence as it is commonly defined and proxied. This is not the case for generic 
expertise,  which  can  easily  be  combined  with  those  criteria  of  independence.  As  a 
consequence, focus on independence may have (had) adverse consequences by reducing 
the ability of Board members to discover and certify financial and non-financial firm-
specific knowledge in circumstances that are likely to be significant in contemporary 
businesses. More precisely, we show that there exists an optimal share of independent 
directors for each company, related to the core characteristics of the business firm. We 
derive  two  main  implications from  this  analysis.  On  the  one  hand,  ‘super-majority’ 
Boards (that is Boards with at least 80% of de jure independent members) appear to be 
attractive devices only in very limited cases – contrary to what is usually called for. On 
the other hand, “grey” or “affiliate” directors (that is, directors that do not meet the 
standard  criteria  of  independence  while  not  being  member  of  the  firm’s  executive 
management) may enhance the overall quality of control, including certification.  
                                                 
3  In  the  U.K.,  the  Combined  Code  (2003;  see  supra,  note  1)  also  contains  financial  expertise 
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Our analysis complements and extends Osterloh and Frey’s (2006) argument, who insist 
on the role that may be played by insiders with firm-specific knowledge in responding 
to critical issues of corporate governance. We expressly focus on the monitoring role of 
the  board,  and  what  is  undoubtedly  at  the  core  of  this  role:  the  supervision  of 
information  flux  from  the  firm  to  outside  stakeholders,  including  investors  on  the 
(stock)  market.  By  so  doing,  we  connect  this  corporate  governance  issue  with 
accounting theory and practice. This connection is partially suggested by Gordon (2007) 
who argues that the growing magnitude of information disclosed by listed companies 
makes insiders and other firm-specific experts less valuable as corporate directors. On 
the  contrary,  our  analysis  stresses  the  importance  of  their  inside  perspective  for 
improving on the quality of disclosure and control. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  The  first  section  disentangles  the 
information  set  available  to  outside  stakeholders,  especially  shareholders,  to  make 
accurate financial decisions concerning the business firm. The main point is that the set 
of business information to be disclosed is jointly constituted of market-driven and firm-
specific information. The latter type of information is likely to be relevant in business 
models where performance is mainly driven by intangibles resources. This distinction is 
mirrored by accounting methods. The second part focuses then on accounting as the 
main device allowing the transmission of information (both market driven and firm-
specific) from the inside to the outside of the business firm. In particular, we argue that 
the  certification  of  financial  statements  by  directors  disposing  of  specific  business 
knowledge becomes increasingly important with the growing significance of intangible 
resources. The third section focuses then on the Board of directors: we discuss Board 
characteristics that are likely to induce an  efficient certification. The existence of  a 
trade-off between two of these characteristics (de jure independence and firm-specific 
expertise) is emphasized, and helps to deliver an optimal share of independent directors, 
depending on the relative importance of intangibles resources in the business model. 
Section fourth concludes. 
 
 
1.  The  informational  basis  of  stock  market  investment  and  corporate 
disclosure  
 
This section disentangles the informational basis of financial decision-making in the 
stock  market  (1.1)  and  relates  this  basis  to  the  kind  of  resources  (tangible  versus 
intangible) involved at the firm level (1.2). 
 
1.1. Financial investors and the relevant information set 
 
Both  standard  setters  –  in  particular  the  U.S.  Financial  Accounting  Standard  Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) that regulates E.U. 
listed corporate groups – and a majority of accounting scholars now share the idea that 
the primary function of financial reporting is the provision of information to investors. 
This provision enables them to assess the amounts, timing and uncertainty of future 
cash ﬂows from their investment in corporate shares or debt securities (SFAC n°1, §37; 
IASB  Framework,  §15).  Under  this  financial  ‘decision  usefulness  paradigm’  of Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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accounting  (Hitz,  2007),  (accounting)  relevance  is  defined  as  the  degree  of 
correspondence between required and disclosed information. Then, the assessment of 
accounting relevance necessarily leads to investigate the kind of information on the 
business  company  (as  opposed  to  macroeconomic  evidence)  required  by  financial 
investors to make accurate financial decisions.  
 
Basic financial theory provides some clear-cut answers as to this kind of information. A 
first  set  of  assumptions  concerns  the  characteristics  of  investors  receiving  the 
information. Investors are expected to be rational (they maximize the expected utility of 
lifetime consumption) and capable of borrowing or lending without constraints, at a 
given  interest  rate i .  Individual  preferences  are  then  irrelevant  (consumption  and 
investment decisions can be separated) and the sole information required by investors is 
the ability of the firm to deliver future revenue. “Fundamental value” of the firm (FV) 










      (1) 
where R
e
t is the expected net cash flow at time t, and i the usual discount rate. 
 
A second set of assumptions concerns the origin of these (expected) cash flows, that is, 
the type of ‘resources’
4 deployed by the production process. In the simplest case, the set 
of resources is only composed of tangible, separable resources. Then, the fundamental 
value of the firm is expected to be equal to the sum, properly discounted, of the net 
contributions of these resources to the fundamental value of the whole firm (see e.g. 
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where r
e
j,t is the expected net contribution of resource aj at time t, j = (1, …, n). In this 
way, the firm merely is a collection of n resources, and the fundamental value of the 
firm corresponds to the aggregation of the fundamental values of its resources. 
 
A third set of assumptions relates to the existence of an efficient pricing for each firm’s 
resource as well as for its shares. Suppose that every resource is traded in a competitive, 
liquid market by rational investors. Then, the equilibrium price (pj) of a resource aj 
equals its fundamental value, so that no mispricing occurs. (Capital) markets are then 
fundamentally ‘efficient’, in the sense that the price of a resource fully and correctly 
incorporates all available information on the ability of this resource to generate net 
revenue through time (Fama, 1970; Malkiel, 1992). As applied to the business firm, the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) implies that the share price of a firm (P) 
                                                 
4 We prefer not to use the term ‘assets’ because of its special accounting meaning: an asset is a resource 
that is recognised in the left side of the balance sheet. Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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is equal to its ‘fundamental value’
5. If all the resources as well as the firm’s shares are 
traded on (fundamentally) efficient markets, then equation (2) becomes: 
  
FV = P = p j
j=1
n
      (3) 
Summing up, under this whole of hypotheses concerning investors, the economic nature 
of the firm and the functioning of markets, the (fundamental) value of a firm (FV) can 
be  derived  from  the  market  value  (pj)  of  all  its  resources  (aj).  This  list  of  prices 
constitutes the whole set of information on the company required by financial market 
investors to properly value the business firm, that is, to assess the structure of its future 
cash flows.  
 
This  conceptual  framework  clearly  relies  on  restrictive  assumptions  and  may  be 
questioned from at least two different viewpoints. Let define Ф the set (or vector) of 
information available to investors to assess the fundamental value of the business firm. 
The first critique refers to the efficiency of share market with respect to the treatment of 
the information set Ф, i.e. to the dynamics of share price formation. Some investors may 
not be fully rational, as recognised by behavioural finance and cognitive psychology 
(Shleifer, 2000): either their preferences depart from the expected utility framework or 
their  beliefs  are  subject  to  overconfidence,  conservatism,  and  irrational  exuberance. 
Even assuming the coexistence of rational and non-rational investors, limits to arbitrage 
(e.g. constraints on short-selling) may prevent an alignment of fundamental and market 
values  (Barberis  and  Thaler,  2003)
6.  In  sum,  and  whatever  the  reasons,  some  may 
question the ability of the market to provide efficient pricing, in the sense of the ECMH: 
market prices may not efficiently ‘exploit’ the relevant information set Ф. 
 
The second viewpoint, the one we shall insist on, disentangles the precise content of Ф, 
rather  than  its  exploitation  by  investors.  While  keeping  the  fundamental  value 
perspective – the idea that investors are primarily interested in the ability of the firm to 
deliver future performance – one should consider the (plausible) facts that the individual 
contributions of each resource cannot be clearly identified (problems occur at the level 
of equation 2), or that some resources may not be transacted on a competitive, liquid 
market  (problems  occur  at  the  level  of  equation  3).  In  these  cases,  the  relevant 
information set should encompass pieces of information that are not encapsulated or 
subsumed  into  a  market  price.  For  instance,  the  aptitude  of  the  firm  to  deliver  a 
particular form of training to its workforce may be a relevant driver of performance 
potential, but it does not have any available market pricing of reference. Accordingly, 
investors  should  generally  rely  upon  a  set  of  available  information  that  is  partly 
endogenously  generated  by  market  pricing  (market-driven),  and  partly  generated  by 
other sources of information, external to the market, which are specific to the firm and 
its  special  economic  environment.  Then,  the  whole  set  of  relevant  (decision-useful) 
information Ф required by investors results from and comprises two main subsets of 
information: 
                                                 
5 Note that this identification of fundamental and market values for a share is a typical result (and not just 
an hypothesis) of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM),  the standard model of equilibrium asset 
pricing, where all investors share homogenous beliefs of the joint distribution of (future) payoffs on the 
share (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). 
6 Moreover, when models of asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs are used, then the identity of market 
price and fundamental value is no longer guaranteed (Stout, 2003). Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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Ф = ( ph ; yk ), h = 1, …, l and k = 1,… , m    (4) 
where ph is the subset of market-driven information, and yk is the subset of non-market, 
firm-specific information.  
 
1.2. The case of intangible resources 
 
So-called ‘intangible’ resources are a typical example of resources that usually do not 
meet the criteria of marketability, while being important drivers of performance for 
contemporary  business  firms.  Intangibles  are  non-physical  (they  lack  any  material 
support), non-financial (they do not provide any legally-enclosed revenue) and provide 
relevant future benefits (Kim, 2007). Generally speaking, the following expenditures are 
associated with the development and maintenance of such intangibles: (i) spending on 
information  and  communication  technologies  (hardware,  telecommunication 
infrastructure  and  software);  (ii)  spending  on  Research  and  Development  (R&D, 
scientific  and  non  scientific)  and  patents;  (iii)  spending  on  development  and 
maintenance of brands and trademarks; (iv) spending on workforce training in firm-
specific capabilities and improvements in labor organization (total quality management, 
job rotation, just-in-time, team working, and so on). 
 
The evidence strongly suggests that intangible resources are a crucial component of 
long-term performance or profit (Villalonga, 2004). At the macro level, measurements 
on US data lead to the conclusion that, at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s,  private  investment  in  intangibles  roughly  equaled  investment  in  tangibles, 
representing around 10% of domestic output (Nakamura, 2003; Corrado, Hulten and 
Sichel, 2006). Corrado et al (2006) find that, for the period 1995-2003, intangibles 
accounted for 27% of the annual growth, a percentage equal to tangibles for the same 
period. At the micro level, countless studies have examined the role played by R&D 
(Griliches,  1994),  new  technologies  (Black  and  Lynch,  2001)  or  innovative 
organizational practices (Black and Lynch, 2001; Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001) on firm 
performance. 
 
Overall, complementarities are shown to be pervasive in a business model driven by 
intangibles (see e.g. Antonelli, 2001; OECD, 2006). Complementarities occur when the 
combination of two different resources yields greater output than their separate use. 
When resource prices are held constant, this combination symmetrically reduces total 
costs. Empirical studies stress the joint contribution provided by intangibles that relate 
to  workforce  training,  R&D  and  organizational  innovation.  For  example,  regarding 
Information  and  Communication  Technologies  (ICT)  and  new  work  practices, 
Breshnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) observe that ICT have a stronger impact on 
productivity  in  firms  that  adopt  decentralized  labor  organization  at  the  same  time. 
Moreover, regarding training and new work practices, different studies provide evidence 
of a correlation between training efforts and labor reorganization, suggesting that their 
joint combination does improve performance (see e.g. Lynch and Black, 1998). Finally, 
Scicchitano (2007) provides evidence of complementarities between R&D and on-the-
job training. 
 
Because  of  such  complementarities,  intangibles  do  not  fit  the  peculiar  framework 
assumed by equations 2 and 3 regarding separability and marketability of individual Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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contributions  (see  also  Ijiri  1967,  p.58;  Lev,  2001).  Furthermore,  even  though  one 
intangible  resource  related  to  some  support  could  be  separately  marketable  (for 
example,  a  patent),  its  sale  might  imply  losing  both  all  complementary  and 
interdependent utilities embedded in its relations with other elements of the firm, and 
the overall contingent advantage which collectively renews the firm performance over 
time. Accordingly, proper information on intangible resources is not, most of the time, 
accessible through markets. Rather, it usually belongs to the  subset of firm-specific 
information. 
 
Summing-up, in a world of complete (meaning one market per resource) and perfect (in 
the sense of fundamentally efficient) markets, the information set would be reduced to a 
list of market prices. Then the certification provided by the Board merely consists in 
assessing  the  firm’s  collection  of  resources  in  line  with  external  market  prices. 
However, relaxing these restrictive assumptions, entity-specific information results to 
be  required  by  outside  stakeholders.  Yet  the  ‘firm-specific’  subset  of  Ф  raises 
challenging question. Market prices are public, objective information, easily accessible 
once generated by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. In addition, their interpretation is 
unambiguous: everyone agrees that a resource whose price goes from 6$ up to 12$ is 
exactly the double than before. By contrast, the statement that the quality of workforce 
training was substantially improved may be interpreted in different ways by different 
actors. Furthermore, the meaning and reliability of this statement also depends on the 
characteristics of the agent that claims it. The difference between the two subsets ph and 
yk  is  nicely  captured  by  the  distinction  between  ‘hard’  and  ‘soft’  information,  as 
proposed by Stein (2002) or Petersen (2004)
7. Accordingly, the quality of firm-specific 
information critically depends on the context under which it is discovered and disclosed, 
and the certifiers of this information are a critical part of the process of disclosure. 
Then, the likelihood for ‘firm-specific’ information to be biased, or incomplete, cannot 
be taken for negligible. As a consequence, even if the (stock) market is efficient, the 
available information set may not be fully relevant to be used by investors for proper  
decision-making. Investors may make the most efficient use of the information set that 
is available, but the latter may be too narrow or biased to provide a proper basis for 
assessing the ability of the firm to deliver performance over the long run. 
 
For these reasons, the production of firm-specific information is typically performed by 
the accounting system, which provides enforced conventions, standards and rules to 
frame the disclosure and reporting processes. From this point of view, the accounting 
system constitutes one of the cognitive prerequisites that enable investors to effectively 
play  the  share  exchange  over  time,  leveling  the  market  playing  field  by  providing 
common  knowledge  on  the  business  entity  performance  and  position  through  time 
(Shubik, 1993; Sunder, 2002). 
 
 
2. Public disclosure of information: the role of accounting 
 
                                                 
7 According to Petersen (2004), “for the information to be hard, the meaning is dependent only upon the 
information which is sent. […] With soft information the context under  which it is  collected and the 
collector of the information are part of the information. It is not possible to separate the two” (p.7). Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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This  section  analyses  the  special  role  played  by  accounting  in  the  disclosure  of 
information (2.1.) and then insists on the specific case of intangibles (2.2.). 
 
 
2.1. Market basis versus entity-specific basis for accounting  
 
Interestingly,  the  previous  distinction  between  the  two  subsets  composing  the 
information  vector  Ф  is  mirrored  by  accounting,  which  shows  two  main  models  or 
bases:  a  “market  basis”  and  an  “entity-specific  basis”  (IASB  2005)
8.  These  models 
primarily  differ  in  accounting  methods  applied  to  represent  business  resources  into 
financial statements (Anthony 2004, p.25). 
 
Accounting for a resource on a ‘market basis’ implies measuring it at its exchange price 
under  competitive  market  conditions,  reflecting  the  market’s  expectations  as  to  the 
amounts,  timing  and  uncertainty  of  future  cash  flows  discounted  at  market  rates  of 
return  for  commensurate  risk.  The  market  basis  appreciates  the  market  price  as  the 






















j,t is the (expected) inflow at time t, 
-r
e
j,t is the (expected) outflow at time t, 
both flows being imputable to the resource j having a market price pj, with i the discount 
rate of reference. 
 
The market basis for accounting therefore applies a “stock method” (measurement on 
the basis of a discounted prevision of a stock of wealth). Known also as ‘fair value’ or 
“marked-to-market” accounting, this stock method may be performed in two different 
ways. Either it is assumed that this measurement has been (efficiently) performed by a 
market:  the  market  price  is  then  used  as  a  direct  measure  of  the  value,  keeping 
accounting  items  in  line  with  external  market  prices  of  reference.  Either  this 
measurement is internally generated through accounting models, considering that no 
efficient  pricing  is  directly  accessible  but  may  be  mimicked  by  relying  on  some 
assumptions on future cash flows and proper discount rates
9.  
 
In contrast, accounting for a resource on an ‘entity-specific basis’ refers to expectations 
and data from the reporting entity. When representing a resource, the entity-specific 
basis applies a “flow method” that recognizes past and current costs (rather than future 
net revenue) under conventions on the continued usefulness of the underlying resource 
for the enduring economy of the firm. So called “historical cost” accounting is a typical 
example of this measurement basis, where resources are accounted for through the flow 
of monetary expenditures (
-rh) related to that resource or activity: 
                                                 
8 This article uses “firm-specific” and “entity-specific” as equivalent expressions 
9 The reliance of ‘marked to model’ on specific information and data, that the market is by definition 
unable  to validate, questions whether this measurement technique really belongs  to the  market basis, 








h j j r C
1
,     (6) 
Where C is the cumulated amount of expenditures 
-r that have been disbursed to period 
) ,..., 1 ( n h    to develop and maintain the resource j. Contrary to the stock method, no 
legal or material support is required, since the resource has not to be marketable. Only 
the existence of imputable expenditures and appropriate conventions of continuity and 
usefulness apply. 
 
Entity-specific basis is not limited to the measurement of resource through so called 
‘historical’  cost  accounting,  but  also  encompasses  the  broad  set  of  qualitative 
statements,  like  narratives  and  classifications,  aiming  at  providing  firm-specific 
information  and/or  forward  looking  information.  This  type  of  firm-specific,  less 
quantitative information has grown rapidly over the last decades. Concerning US listed 
companies, Gordon (2007) documents a large increase in the quantity of firm specific 
information delivered, in particular, through the Form 10-K, from about 75 pages in 
1985  to  166  in  2004.  Of  particular  interest  is  the  growth  of  the  ‘Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis’ (MD&A), that should, according to the SEC (Securities Act 
Rel. n°6711, April 21 1987) “focus specifically on material events and uncertainties 
known  to  management  that  would  cause  reported  financial  information  not  to  be 
necessarily  indicative  of  future  operating  results  or  of  future  financial  conditions”. 
According to Gordon (2007), average MD&A expanded from about 5 pages in 1985 to 
24 in 2004. In France, entity-specific basis of accounting is provided for by the Rapport 
de  gestion  (Business  report,  Commercial  Code  art.  L.  225-102-1)),  and  the 
complementary disclosure on corporate social responsibility established by the “New 
Economic Regulation” (NER) Act of May 2001 (Law n°2001-420 of 15 May 2001). 
This set of reports delivers ‘forward looking information’ (through a document on the 
general situation of the company and its expected evolution) as well as a document 
detailing how social and environmental consequences of corporate activity are dealt 
with. Needless to say, this information is firm-specific , of a ‘soft’ nature, and lacks in 
adequate market pricing of reference. 
 
To  conclude,  by  referring  to  expenditures  incurred  by  the  firm  or  to  qualitative 
information specific to it, the entity-specific basis of accounting clearly refers to the 
firm-specific subset of the Ф vector, while the marked-to-market basis of accounting 
refers to the market subset.  
 
2.2. Accounting for intangibles 
 
The regulatory treatment of intangible resources offers a conspicuous example of the 
consequences of these two accounting bases. A first possibility is to favor a market 
basis for the measurement of these resources: the international accounting standard for 
intangible assets (IAS38, §39) retains this solution, linking informational reliability to 
market-based estimates of value. Therefore, this accounting standard denies the asset 
recognition and measurement to a number of expenditures related to resources that lack 
a proper market basis, such as “research activities aimed at obtaining new knowledge; 
search for, evaluation and final selection of, applications of research findings or other 
knowledge; search for alternatives for materials, devices, products, processes, systems Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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or  services;  and  the  formulation,  design,  evaluation  and  final  selection  of  possible 
alternatives for new or improved materials, devices, products, processes, systems or 
services” (IAS 38, §56). Generally speaking, internally generated intangibles, such as 
core  research  activities,  are  not  capitalized  as  assets,  even  though  “entity’s  costing 
systems can often measure reliably the cost of generating an intangible asset internally, 
such as salary and other expenditure incurred” (IAS 38, §62).
10 
 
Therefore, this regulatory choice to confine the accounting reporting to market basis 
methods is likely to involve investment decision-making based on an incomplete set of 
information, whenever intangible assets are important drivers for future performance
11. 
On the contrary, the importance of intangibles should pave the way to appreciating 
other  accounting  methods  having  an  entity-specific  basis.  A  pure  historical  cost 
accounting  system,  that  may  capitalize  and  amortize  the  expenditures  (including 
deferred charges) linked to internally generated intangibles as depreciable assets, is a 
convenient way to perform this measurement. Evidence of this treatment have existed in 
European  accounting  systems  and  regulations  before  the  adoption  of  International 
Financial Reporting Standards (see e.g. in the French case: “Plan Comptable Général”, 
articles n°361-1, 361-2, and 361-3), and in the current Japanese accounting standards on 
R&D Cost and Intangible Assets. 
 
Furthermore, this entity-specific accounting representation is not limited to financial 
figures  (quantitative  information),  but  may  also include  classifications  and  narrative 
explanations  (qualitative  information),  disclosed  according  to  accepted  principles  of 
informational veracity. An interesting case of such a system as applied to intangibles is 
provided by the French regulation on social reporting (“bilan social”), which requires 
big companies to establish a conventionally standardized set of non-financial measures 
on workforce-related issues such as remuneration, training, and security at work (Law nº 
77-769 of 12 July 1977). This set is not publicly disclosed, but is available to every 
employees  and  their  representatives.  Another  example  is  the  voluntary  disclosure 
devoted to environmental and social responsibility issues that is increasingly provided 
by  companies  worldwide  and  sometimes  audited  by  specialized  consulting  firms 
(KPMG, 2008). 
 
In conclusion, improvements on an entity-specific basis appear to be best suited for 
recognizing and accounting for intangibles resources while coping with the main goals 
                                                 
10 Other examples are provided by IAS38 – Intangible Assets, §6, ver. 1998 and IAS38 – Intangible 
Assets, §63-64. On this point, see Eckstein (2004). 
11 This point is fully acknowledged by the OECD (2006, p.7), who notes: “traditional accounting has 
necessarily remained focused on tangible assets. Traditionally, the only intangible assets recognized in 
financial statements have been intellectual property, such as patents and trademarks where a market 
value has been established by a transaction, and acquired items such as goodwill. Although accounting 
standards can probably be developed further to take into account a wider range of intangibles, clear 
limits are set by  the difficulty of  establishing monetary values (valuation)  that are at  the  same  time 
consistent across firms, verifiable and that cannot be easily manipulated. As a result, a significant portion 
of  corporate  assets  go  under-reported  in  the  financial  accounts.  The  relative  lack  of  accounting 
recognition of intangibles coupled with their growing importance in the value creation process means 
that the financial statements have lost some of their value for shareholders. If other information does not 
fill the void, there could be misallocation of resources in capital markets”. See also Blair and Wallman 
(2001). Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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of auditing and enforceability of public information disclosure. Intangibles may then be 
recognized and accounted for through capitalization of bundles of imputable monetary 
outflows (expenditures), supplementary systems of non-monetary measurements, and 
trustworthy  disclosure  of  narrative  information.  This  inside-related  information  may 
require special control setting to be disclosed and audited in a reliable and consistent 
way. In particular, and this is the crucial point we shall discuss in the following section, 
the certification of such information disclosure necessarily requires some firm-specific 
expertise by directors. 
 
 
3. Board independence and firm-specific expertise: the trade-off 
 
Under the “decision usefulness paradigm”, the performance of the accounting process 
should be evaluated according to the degree of correspondence between required and 
disclosed information. This performance is then a function of the system of disclosure 
achieving  this  process  including  the  accounting  standards  and  the  actors  having 
ultimately  in  charge  the  certification  of  the  financial  statements.  Accordingly, 
companies’  directors  have  a  crucial  role  to  play  to  enhance  the  overall  quality  of 
financial and non-financial reporting (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2004). In 
turn,  this  may  improve  the  accuracy  of  financial  decision-making  by  investors  and 
shareholders. 
 
As part of its monitoring role, including the validation of financial and non-financial 
reporting, an essential attribute for the Board is the propensity of its members not to 
collude with corporate executives – that is to be “objective” (Boot and Macey, 2004). 
Of course, objectivity is ultimately a subjective disposition. Yet distant shareholders and 
other external stakeholders, as well as regulators, need to rely on clear-cut proxies. 
Accordingly,  the  basic  idea  common  to  a  number  of  existing  definitions  of 
“independence”  is  to  identify  some  objective  criteria  that  minimize  the  conflict  of 
interests between directors and corporate officers. Generally speaking, independence is 
assumed to be compromised if the director of a company (i) is, or has been, a corporate 
executive of that company or of its affiliates, (ii) is, or has been, employed by that 
company or by its affiliates, (iii) is employed as an executive of another company where 
any of that company’s executives sit on the Board, (iv) is a large block-holder of that 
company, (v) has a significant business relationship with that company or its affiliates. 
On  this  basis,  three  types  of  directors  are  usually  distinguished  according  to  their 
relative degree of independence (Clarke, 2007). “Executive” or “inside” directors are 
corporate executives. “Affiliated” or “gray” directors are not executives, but they do not 
meet one of the previous criteria; this category encompasses in particular employees, 
long-term block-holders or investment bankers in relation with the company. Finally, 
“independent” directors are outsiders that fulfil the whole set of criteria. 
 
As  a  general  proposition,  de  jure  independence  is  supposed  to  foster  “objectivity”, 
which  in  turn  increases  the  probability  to  impose  sanctions  on  imprudent  or 
underperforming  managers.  Following  this  approach,  Ferreira,  Ferreira  and  Raposo 
(2008) define independence as the probability for a CEO to be fired and replaced by the 
Board,  once  the  share  market  (or  the  Board  itself)  has  discovered  the  CEO’s  poor 
performance. Considering certification, such a definition of independence makes sure Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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that directors will reject information that they believe to be biased or incomplete, and 
will make sure that appropriate market values have been used to evaluate corporate 
assets (Gordon, 2007).  
 
However,  independence  (even  augmented  with  generic  literacy  in  accounting  and 
finance) can be the sole attribute determining the quality of disclosure only when the 
information set to be certified only comprises market-driven information. As argued 
supra (1.1), a non-negligible part of the relevant information set needed by investors is 
firm-specific (yk) and the quality of this “soft” information is intrinsically related to the 
characteristics  of  the  actors  that  produce  and  certify  it.  Put  differently,  accounting 
figures are not, most of the time, subject to validation through market evidence. This is 
especially true for narrative information dealing with intangibles (see supra 2.2), as well 
as for ‘forward looking’ information intending to identify factors that may impact firm’s 
future performance and position. But this is also true for pure historical cost accounting:  
the appropriate identification, classification and imputation of expenditures to related 
intangible resources requires a specific knowledge of the context and processes that 
have been in place inside the firm to develop and maintain these resources. 
 
Whenever  firm-specific  information  is  disclosed,  the  economic  usefulness  of  the 
certification  of  accounting  information  by  the  Board  depends  on  the  ability  of  its 
members  to  actually  understand  the  main  features  of  the  business  model.  And  this 
cognitive aptitude is less related to a generic expertise in accounting and finance than to 
specific  knowledge  of  that  business  over  time  (Lanfranconi  and  Robertson,  2002). 
When  directors  do  not  have  any  particular  firm-specific  expertise,  then  their 
certification becomes purely formal, whilst acquiring economic significance whenever 
the magnitude of such expertise increases.  
 
Therefore, trustworthy certification requires both the willingness to refuse accreditation 
of  biased  or  narrow  reports,  and  the  ability  to  discover  and  assess  firm-specific 
information.  As  a  consequence,  the  overall  quality  of  control  over  the  information 
disclosure  increases  with  both  independence  of  directors  and  their  firm-specific 
expertise.Yet, while there is no reason to posit that generic expertise is negatively linked 
to de jure independence, things are different for firm-specific expertise. As the previous 
definition  makes  clear,  the  usual  criteria  applied  to  proxy  independence  in  practice 
result in putting a distance between the firm and its directors so as to minimize potential 
conflict of interests with executive management. In turn, this distance tends to reduce 
the directors’ ability to discover and assess firm-specific knowledge. By contrast, being 
part of the firm as a going concern (as do executives and non-executive employees) or 
being in close connection with it (as do investment bankers, or large block-holders, or 
representatives of main stakeholders) provides some noticeable advantage in dealing 
with firm-specific information based on inside knowledge of the business model. It is 
widely  recognized  that  independent  (outside)  directors  experience  a  cognitive 
disadvantage  over  non-independent  (insider)  directors  (see  e.g.  Baysinger  and 
Hoskisson,  1990,  p.74;  Klein,  1998,  p.  278;  Osterloh  and  Frey,  2006).  This 
disadvantage  may,  in  some  circumstances,  undermine  the  overall  monitoring 
performance of a purely independent Board. For instance, appointing an independent 
director (an academic lawyer in corporate governance, for example) to the Board of a 
listed bio-technology firm – a Board that should certify the disclosed information on the Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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way R&D activities are dealt with – is like appointing an economist to an academic jury 
concerned with a doctoral defence in theological aesthetics. While the economist will 
surely be ‘objective’ (meaning impartial in the conflicts running across the theological 
aesthetics scholars community) one may seriously doubt of its ability to actually assess 
the overall quality of the candidate. 
 
A  complementary  way  to  express  the  argument  is  to  distinguish  between  de  jure 
(formal) independence and real (substantial) independence. Because of the cognitive 
disadvantage they have over insiders, de jure independent directors have to rely on the 
information provided by the firm’s executive management to fulfil their monitoring role 
(McNulty  and  Pettygrew,  1999).  This  reliance  actually  limits  directors’  real 
independence, i.e. the ability to monitor in perfect ‘objectivity’. By contrast, a firm-
specific expertise, in the sense of a deeper business understanding, may increase real 
independence (Hooghiemstra and van Manen, 2004; Wagner, 2008). 
 
Summing-up, independence offers decisive advantages in terms of control, but it also 
implies an opportunity cost by reducing the Board’s ability to cope with entity-specific 
information. Accordingly, a fundamental trade-off can be reasonably expected between 




The following economic model aims to capture the basic functioning of this trade-off. 
For sake of simplicity, let assume that each Board member may be either a firm-specific 
expert (defined as e) or independent (defined as i). Normalizing the size of the Board to 
one, we have (with i the relative share of independent Board members): 
i =1 – e∈ (0,1) 
 
Furthermore, let assume that the firm is characterised by a given relative presence of 
intangible resources, which do not have a market basis of accounting and disclosure. 
This degree k is normalised to one. Moreover, let assume that k ≥ e. This simply implies 
that the knowledge or expertise by the Board is never complete.  
 
In this framework, the total agency cost related to the Board acting as certifier may be 
defined as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k e M k e C k i D e i W k e i B , , , ,    , , + + +     (7) 
 
Or, equivalently, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k i M k i C k i D i i W k i B , 1 , 1 , 1 ,    ,   +   + +        (7’) 
                                                 
12 Ferreira et al (2008) propose a model, where shareholders optimize on the level of independence. Like 
our argument, the main advantage of independence is to make sure that a ‘bad’ CEO will be fired. But the 
tradeoff they propose is different: in their model, there is a monetary cost supported by shareholders for 
independency (due to dispersed ownership in particular). Here, the cost of independence is non-monetary: 
it is the reduced ability of directors to acquire and certify firm-specific information. A further difference 
might be pinpointed: while the ability for the Board to identify a bad CEO is exogenous in their model, 
our analysis suggests that this ability is endogenous. In particular, it is decreasing with the level of de jure 





•  W(i,e) is the fixed cost of the Board related to the remunerations (wi , we) paid to 
its  members  (i  ,e).  Its  derivative  is  increasing  (or  null)  in  i  when  the  independent 
member remuneration is higher than the expert member remuneration (W’i ≥ 0 iff wi ≥ 
we), and decreasing in i otherwise (W’i < 0 iff wi < we). Analytically, a generic function 
denotes this cost as follows: 
( ) e w i w i i W e i   +   =   1 ,   (8) 
 
where W’i , W’e  > 0. 
 
•  D(i,k) is the ignorance cost of the Board relative to its level of independence. It 
arises  because  independent  members  lack  in  the  ability  to  discover,  understand  and 
certify relevant non-market, entity-specific information (k). According to the previous 
discussion, higher is the level of k, for a given level of i, lower is the ability of the 
Board to understand, and consequently check, the management behaviour (analytically, 
the derivative is then increasing in k: D’k  > 0); and higher is the level of independence 
of the Board (i), lower is the ability of the Board to understand a given k (analytically, 
the derivative is increasing in i: D’i  > 0). Furthermore, let assume: D(i,0) = 0 (i.e. if 
there are not entity-specific information, then no ignorance cost will arise for any i); and 
D(0,k) = 0  ( i.e. if the Board comprises only experts, then, by definition, no ignorance 
cost will arise for any k). Analytically, this cost may be described as follows: 
( ) k i d k i D     = ,    (9) 
 
where d > 0 and D’i , D’k  > 0. 
 
•  C(e,k) is the perking cost of the Board relative to its level of entity-specific 
expertise. It arises because specific expertise implies appointing Board members who 
are “insiders” and may then collude with management more easily than independent 
members. It is possible to rewrite this function as C(1-i,k). Its derivative is decreasing in 
i: C’i < 0 (i.e. higher i, lower the perking cost), and increasing in k: C’k  > 0 (i.e. higher 
k, higher the opportunity to collude). Furthermore, let assume: C(e,0) = 0 (i.e. if there 
are no entity-specific information, then no perking costs arise for any e : there is no 
specific  information  to  hidden);  and  C(0,k)  =  0    (i.e.  if  the  Board  comprises  only 
independent  members,  then,  by  definition,  no  perking  cost  arises  for  any  k). 
Analytically, this cost may be described as follows: 
( ) k e c k e C     = ,    (10) 
 
where c > 0 and C’e , C’k  > 0. 
 
•  M(e,k)  is  the  monitoring  supplemental  cost  of  the  Board  relative  to  its 
independence. It arises because independent directors may need to hire professional 
consultants and auditors to assist them; the cost of hiring external experts therefore 
constitutes the opportunity cost of maintaining higher level of independence. According 
to the previous discussion, higher is k, higher is the cumulated cost of these external 
advises required to cope with k (analytically, the derivative respect to k is positive: Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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M’k>0). Furthermore, higher is the quota of expert membership of the Board (e), lower 
is the monitoring cost (i.e. the derivative respect e is negative: M’e < 0). Finally, when 
e = k, then M(k,k) = 0: when e reaches the maximum value, then there is no need to hire 
professional  consultants  and  the  opportunity  cost  is  null.  Analytically,  this  cost  is 
described as follows:  
( ) ( )
2
2
1 , e k m k e M       =   (11) 
 
Where m > 0 and Mk > 0 , Me < 0, with k ≥ e. 
 
Accordingly, the total agency cost of the Board may be denoted as follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1 1 , , i k m k c k i c d w i w w k e i B e e i +       +   +       + +     =   (12) 
 
Efficiency requires to minimize this total cost B(i,e,k) for each level of entity-specific 
information (k). Figure 1 comprises two graphs: graph 1 denotes the cost curve for each 
level of k; graph 2 denotes the corresponding locus of optimal values for (i*,k*).
13 
 
*** Insert Figure 1 here *** 
 
In the graph (1), the y-axis represents the total cost B(i,k) and the x-axis the level of  
independence  of  the  Board  (i).  Each  curve  identifies  the  value  of B(i,k=given)  and 
shows how such cost changes for each level of i when k is given. When k increases the 
cost function B(i,k) is identified by escalating curves.  
 
For a given level of entity-specific information (k), it is possible to identify an optimal 
level of Board independence that minimizes the cost function B(i,k). Since higher k 
implies descending cost curves, then the optimal level of i, given by B’i(i,k
*)=0, is a 
decreasing  function  of  k.  This  decreasing  function  identifies  the  trade  off  between 
entity-specific information (k) and Board independence (i). Solving the minimization of 
the cost function B(i,e,k) for each value of k, we obtain the i-k trade-off function: 
 
( ) ( )
m
k m c d w w
i
e i +   +  
  =1     (13) 
 
This means that, higher is the entity-specific information (k), lower is the optimal level 
of independence of the Board (i). Our analysis then predicts that the optimal proportion 
of (de jure) independent Board members for a firm is decreasing with the importance of 
intangible resources in corporate performance. This relation between k and i depends on 
parameters. In particular, the optimal level of independent directors is lower when:  
-  wi is higher then we ; 
-  d is higher than c (i.e. the ignorance cost is higher than the perking cost); 
-  m is higher (i.e. higher cost to hire external experts). 
 
                                                 
13 This graph describes a simulation of the model when wi =we=1,m=4,d=2,c=3. Different values of the 
parameters will not change the main results. Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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Graph (2) shows the i-k trade off function. When the degree of intangible resources (k) 
is zero, the optimal level of Board independence (i) is one: all members of the Board 
should be independent. Furthermore, i = 1 implies e = 0 and no perking cost arises. 
Finally, k = 0 implies that there is no specific information to discover: the ignorance 
cost is null. When k increases, for example when the management of the firm develops 
innovative  practices,  products  or  technologies,  the  relevant  level  of  entity-specific 
information  increases,  and  a  full  independent  Board  (i=1)  is  no  longer  capable  to 
discover and properly certify the new ‘information set’ alone. A trade off between i and 
k arises. If the composition of the Board does not change, the agency cost will increase 
because k is higher. From one side, the ignorance cost increases (D’k>0); from the other 
side, the independent Board has to hire professional experts to compensate its ignorance 
in  entity-specific  information  k ( M’i  = -  M’e  >  0).  More  k  increases,  higher  is  the 
incurred cost to maintain a full independent Board. At some point k0 (depending on 
parameters),  a  full  independent  Board  becomes  inefficient:  for  each  k  >  k0  the 
minimization of cost implies that some independent members of the Board should be 
substituted  by  expert  members.  This  new  composition  of  the  Board  implies  lower 
monitoring  costs  (since  expert  members  do  better  understand  the  entity-specific 
information), even though this increases the likelihood of supplemental perking cost 
(which increases in e: C’e > 0). 
 
Generally  speaking,  the  trade-off  implies  an  optimal  composition  of  the  Board 
comprising a mix of expert and independent members. The optimal share depends on 
the changing characteristics of industry and business (captured by parameters). Beyond 
some level of independence, further increases may then undermine the overall ability of 
the Board to perform an effective control on the business firm. As such, “excessive” 
independence may have adverse consequences and ultimately damage the performance 
of the firm. To some extent, this analysis sheds some light to a long-standing empirical 
puzzle: independence has a negligible or negative effect on firm performance (see e.g. 
Klein,  1998;  Dalton,  Daily,  Ellstrand  and  Johnson,  1998;  Bhagat  and  Black,  1999; 
Klein, Shapiro and Young, 2005; Bhagat, Bolton and Romano, 2008)
14. This argument 
also provides some support to the emergent critique of the independence “vogue”, as 
championed by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005), the main contributors to the Higgs 
Report
 that led to the revision, in November 2003, of the British Combined Code: “the 
advocacy by institutional investors, policy advisors and the business media for greater 
non-executive independence may be too crude or even counter-productive” (p. S19). 
 
By contrast, non-independent ‘grey’ or ‘affiliated’ directors, whose position involves 
firm-specific expertise, denote some attractive attributes to enhance the efficiency of 
corporate control and the overall quality of corporate disclosure. It is particularly the 
case with (non executive) employee representatives. On the one hand, the latter have 
long-term  relationships  with  the  firm  as  a  going  concern,  while  their  interests  rest 
distinct from those of the executive managerial team. On the other hand, workforce 
training in firm-specific capabilities and labor organization are identified among the 
                                                 
14  See  e.g.  Bhagat,  Bolton  and  Romano  (2008):  “Board  independence,  however,  is  negatively  and 
significantly related to contemporaneous, next year’s, and next two years’ operating performance. This 
result  is  surprising,  especially  considering  the  recent  emphasis  that  has  been  placed  on  board 
independence by the stock exchanges’ amended listing requirements post-Enron; however, it is consistent 
with prior literature on boards” (p.1850)  Contribution au Forum de la Régulation 2009 
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main components of intangible drivers of performance (see Corrado et al, 2006). The 
inclusion of employee representatives on the Board may then enhance its ability to cope 
with  firm-specific  information  and  intangibles  (on  this  point,  see  also  Osterloh  and 
Frey, 2006). This point is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Fauver 
and  Fuerst  (2006),  who  show  that  the  inclusion  of  worker  representatives  in  the 
(supervisory) Board of German firms is positively correlated (up to a certain point) with 





This article has dealt with the quality of financial reporting as a crucial component of 
efficient corporate control and share market pricing. The role of the Board of directors 
has been primarily investigated. We have shown that firm-specific expertise may be an 
important attribute for directors when the relevant information set for investors and 
shareholders  encompasses  so-called  ‘entity-specific’  information.  It  is  especially  the 
case whenever intangible are significant drivers of performance, such as in high-tech 
and innovative industries. Yet we argued that this kind of expertise trades-off with de 
jure independence that is commonly advocated by institutional investors and policy-
makers. Therefore, more (de jure) independence is not always desirable: there exists an 
optimal share of independent Board members that decreases with the importance of 
intangible  resources.  In  sum,  our  analysis  points  to  the  attractiveness  of  pluralistic 
Board appointments composed of (de jure) independent members, affiliated members 
and representatives of stakeholders having specific knowledge of the business affairs. 
By  contrast,  and  except  in  situations  where  business  performance  originate  from  a 
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